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Estimating a Search and




he search and matching model has become the workhorse for labor
marketissuesinmacroeconomics. Itisaconceptuallyattractiveframe-
work as it provides a rationale for the existence of equilibrium unem-
ployment, such that workers who would be willing to work for the prevailing
wagecannotﬁndajob. Byfocusingonthesearchandmatchingaspect,thatis,
workers searching for jobs, ﬁrms searching for workers, and both sides being
matchedwitheachother,themodelalsoprovidesadescriptionofemployment
ﬂows in an economy. Moreover, the search and matching model is tractable
enoughtobeintegratedintostandardmacroeconomicmodelsasanalternative
to the perfectly competitive Walrasian labor market model.
However,thesearchandmatchingframeworkhasbeencriticized,mostno-
tably by Shimer (2005), for being unable to match key labor market statistics,
chieﬂythevolatilityofunemploymentandjobvacancies. Thisobservationhas
generated a large amount of research intended to remedy this “puzzle.” Most
of this literature is largely theoretical and based on calibration. Only recently
have there been efforts to more formally study the quantitative implications
of the entire search and matching framework. This article is among the ﬁrst
attempts to take a search and matching model to the data in a full-information
setting.1
In this article I contribute to these efforts by estimating a small search and
matching model using Bayesian methods. My focus is mainly on the actual
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parameter estimates and the implied sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Calibrating the search and matching model tends to be problematic since
some of the model parameters, such as the bargaining share or the value of
staying unemployed, are difﬁcult to pin down. Hence, much of the arguments
abouttheempiricalusefulnessofthesearchandmatchingmodelcenteraround
alternative calibrations. This paper provides some perspective on this issue
by adopting a full-information approach in estimating the model. Parameters
are selected so as to be consistent with the co-movement patterns in the full
data set as seen through the prism of the theoretical model.
My main ﬁnding is that the structural parameters of the model are gener-
ally tightly estimated and robust across various empirical speciﬁcations that
include different sets of observables and shock processes. Parameters associ-
ated with the matching process tend to be more stable than those associated
with the search process. However, I also ﬁnd that the estimates are con-
sistent with an emerging consensus on the search and matching model (e.g.,
Hornstein,Krusell,andViolante2005andHagedornandManovskii2008)that
emphasizesalowbargainingpowerbutahighoutsideoptionforaworker. On
a more cautionary note, I show that the most important determinant of labor
marketdynamicsareexogenousmovementsinthematchefﬁciency,whiches-
sentially acts as a residual in an adjustment equation for unemployment. This
ﬁnding casts doubt on the viability of the search and matching framework to
provide a theory for labor market dynamics.
In a larger sense, this article also deals with the issue of identiﬁcation in
structural general equilibrium models. I use the term “identiﬁcation” loosely
in that I ask whether the theoretical model contains enough restrictions to
back out parameters from the data. In that respect, the search and matching
framework performs reasonably well. But identiﬁcation also has a dimension
that may be more relevant for the theoretical modeler. I show that speciﬁc
parameters, such as the worker beneﬁt or search costs, can vary widely across
speciﬁcations, and thus are likely not identiﬁed in either an econometric or
economic sense. I also argue that they capture the stable behavior of an
underlyingstructure. Theythereforeadapttoachangeintheenvironmentand
might be better described as reduced-form coefﬁcients.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I lay out a simple
search and matching model, followed by a discussion in Section 2 of the
empiricalstrategyandthedataused. InSection3, Ipresentthebenchmarkes-
timationresults,discusstheestimateddynamics,andinvestigatethesourcesof
business cycle ﬂuctuations. Section 4 contains various robustness checks that
changethesetofobservablesandtheexogenousshocks. Section5concludes.T. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 103
1. A SIMPLE SEARCHAND MATCHING MODEL
I develop a simple search and matching model in which the labor market is
subject to frictions. Workers and ﬁrms cannot meet instantaneously but must
go through a time-consuming search process. The costs of ﬁnding a partner
giverisetorentsthatﬁrmsandworkerssharebetweeneachother. Thus,wages
aretheoutcomeofabargainingprocessandarenotdeterminedcompetitively.
The labor market set-up is embedded in a simple general equilibrium frame-
work with optimizing consumers and ﬁrms that serves as a data-generating
process for aggregate time series. The model is otherwise standard and has
been extensively studied in the literature.2 I ﬁrst describe the optimization
problems of households and ﬁrms, followed by a discussion of the labor mar-
ket and wage determination.
The Household
Time is discrete and the time period is one quarter. The economy is populated
by a continuum of households. Each household consists of a continuum of
workers of measure one. Individual households send out their members to
the labor market, where they search for jobs when unemployed, and supply
laborserviceswhenemployed. Duringunemploymenttheafﬂictedhousehold
member receives government beneﬁts, while all employed workers earn the
wage rate. Total income is shared equally among all members. I hereby
follow the literature and abstract from heterogeneity in asset holdings and
consumption of individual workers and households (see Merz 1995).3 In
what follows I drop any household- and worker-speciﬁc indices.













where C is aggregate consumption and n ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of employed
household members, which is determined in the matching market for labor
services and is not subject to the household’s control. β ∈ (0,1) is the
discount factor and σ ≥ 0 is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. χt is an
exogenous stochastic process, which I refer to as a labor shock. Note that in
thebenchmarkversionIassumethathouseholdsvalueleisure,whichissubject
to stochastic shifts. As we will see later on, this affects wage determination
and the interpretation of the parameter estimates.
The representative household’s budget constraint is
Ct + Tt = wtnt + (1 − nt)b +  t. (2)
2 Pissarides (2000) gives an excellent overview of the search and matching framework.
3 Trigari (2006) gives a concise description of the assumptions required for this construct.104 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The household receives unemployment beneﬁts, b, from the government,
which are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax, T.  t are proﬁts that the house-
hold receives as the owner of the ﬁrms. w is the wage paid to each employed
worker. The sole problem of the household is to determine the consump-
tion path of its members. There is no explicit labor supply choice since the
employment status of the workers is the outcome of the matching process.
Since the household’s program does not involve any intertemporal decision,
the ﬁrst-order condition is simply
C−σ
t = λt, (3)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
The Labor Market
The household supplies labor services to ﬁrms in a frictional labor market.





which describes the outcome of the search process. Unemployed job seekers,
ut, and vacancies, vt, are matched at rate m(ut,v t), where 0 <ξ<1i st h e
match elasticity of the unemployed, and the stochastic process, μt, affects
the efﬁciency of the matching process. The aggregate probability of ﬁlling a
vacancy (taken parametrically by the ﬁrms) is q(θt) = m(vt,u t)/vt, where
θt = vt/ut is labor market tightness. I assume that it takes one period for new
matchestobecomeproductiveandthatbotholdandnewmatchesaredestroyed
at a constant rate. The evolution of employment, deﬁned as nt = 1 − ut,i s
then given by





where 0 <ρ<1 is the constant separation rate that measures inﬂows into
unemployment.
The Firms
The ﬁrm sector is populated by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that pro-
duce differentiated products. This assumption deviates from the standard
search and matching framework, which lets atomistic ﬁrms operate in a per-
fectly competitive environment. I introduce this modiﬁcation to be able to
analyze the effects of mark-up variations on labor market dynamics, as sug-
gested by Rotemberg (2008). The ﬁrms’ output is demanded by households
withapreferenceforvarietythatresultsindownward-slopingdemandcurves.
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where yt is ﬁrm production (and its demand), Yt is aggregate output, pt is
the price set by the ﬁrm, and Pt is the aggregate price index. The stochastic
process, εt, is the time-varying demand elasticity. I assume that all ﬁrms be-




At is an aggregate technology process and 0 <α≤ 1 introduces curvature
intoproduction. Thisimplicitlyassumesthatcapitalisﬁxedandﬁrm-speciﬁc.





















subject to the employment accumulation equation (4) and the demand func-
tion (5). Proﬁts are evaluated at the household’s discount factor in terms of
marginalutility,λt. FollowingRotemberg(2008),Iassumethatvacancypost-
ing is subject to cost, κ
ψv
ψ
t , where κ>0 and ψ>0. For 0 <ψ<1, posting
costs exhibit decreasing returns while costs are increasing for ψ>1. The
standard case in the literature with ﬁxed vacancy costs is given by ψ = 1.






− wt + (1 − ρ)Etβt+1τt+1 and (8)
κv
ψ−1
t = (1 − ρ)q(θt)Etβt+1τt+1, (9)
where βt+1 = βλt+1/λt is a stochastic discount factor and τt is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the employment constraint. It repre-
sents the current-period marginal value of a job. This is given by a worker’s
marginal productivity, net of wage payments, and the expected value of the
worker in the next period if the job survives separation.
Since hiring is costly, ﬁrms spread employment adjustment over time.
Firms that hire workers today reap beneﬁts in the future since lower hiring
costs can be expended otherwise. This is captured by the second condition,
which links the expected beneﬁt of a vacancy in terms of the marginal value
of a worker to its cost, given by the left-hand side. Note that this is adjusted






. Firms are more willing
to post vacancies, the higher the probability is that they can ﬁnd a worker.
Moreover, vacancy posting also depends positively on the worker’s expected
marginal value, τt+1, (and thus productivity and wages) and on the elasticity
of posting costs.106 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Combining these two equations results in the job creation condition typi-




















off against the surplus over wage payments it can appropriate and against the
beneﬁt of not having to hire someone next period.
Wage Determination
Wagesaredeterminedastheoutcomeofabilateralbargainingprocessbetween
workers and ﬁrms. Since the workforce is homogeneous without any differ-
ences in skill, each worker is marginal when bargaining with the ﬁrm. Both
parties choose wage rates to maximize the joint surplus generated from their
employment relationship: Surpluses accruing to the matched parties are split
to maximize the weighted average of the individual surpluses. It is common












where η ∈ [0,1] is the workers’ weight,
∂Wt(nt)
∂nt is the marginal value of a
worker to the household’s welfare, and
∂Jt(nt)
∂nt is the marginal value of the
worker to the ﬁrm.4
The latter term is given by the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to employment, Eq. (8), where we deﬁne τt =
∂Jt(nt)




terms of a recursive representation. If the worker is employed, he contributes
to household value by earning a wage, wt. However, he suffers disutility
from working, χt (which is simply the exogenous preference shifter), and
forfeits the outside option payments, b. This is weighted against next period’s
expected utility. The marginal value of a worker is thus given by
∂Wt(nt)
∂nt






Using the employment equation (4), I can then substitute for
∂nt+1
∂nt = (1 −
ρ)[1 − θtq(θt)]. Furthermore, note that real payments are valued at the
marginal utility, λt.
4 Detailed derivations of the bargaining solutions and the utility values can be found in Trigari
(2006) and Krause and Lubik (2007).T. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 107
Taking derivatives of (11) with respect to the bargaining variable, wt,










Substituting the marginal utility values results, after lengthy algebra, in an


















As is typical in models with surplus sharing, the wage is a weighted average
of the payments accruing to workers and ﬁrms, with each party appropriating
a fraction of the other’s surplus. The bargained wage also includes mutual
compensation for costs incurred, namely hiring costs and the utility cost of
working. The bargaining weight determines how close the wage is to either
the marginal product or to the outside option of the worker, the latter of which




sumtaxes, T, andthatthegovernmentrunsabalancedbudget, Tt = (1−nt)b.






t = Yt. (15)
In the aggregate, employment evolves according to the law of motion:










namely the technology shock, At, the labor shock, χt, the demand shock, εt,
and the matching shock, μt. I assume that the logarithms of these shocks
follow independent AR(1) processes with coefﬁcients ρi, i ∈ (A,χ,ε,μ)







Most papers in the labor market search and matching literature that take a
quantitative perspective rely on calibration methods and concentrate on the
model’s ability to replicate a few key statistics. One issue with such an ap-
proach is that information on some model parameters is difﬁcult to come by.
The bargaining parameter, η, and the worker’s outside option, b, are prime
examples. Much of the debate on the viability of search and matching as a108 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
description of the labor market centers around the exact values of these pa-
rameters (Shimer 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008). In this article, I
therefore take an encompassing, but somewhat agnostic, perspective on the
model’s empirical implication. I treat the model as a data-generating process
for a large set of aggregate variables. My focus is on the actual parameter
estimates, the implied adjustment dynamics, and the contribution of various
driving forces to labor market movements.
Methodology
I estimate the model using Bayesian methods. First, I log-linearize the non-
linear model around a deterministic steady state and write the linearized
equilibrium conditions in a state-space form. The resulting linear rational
expectations model can then easily be solved by methods such as in Sims
(2002). The model thus describes a data-generating process for a set of ag-
gregate variables. Deﬁne a vector of model variables, Xt, and a data vector
of observable variables, Zt. The state-space representation of the model can
then be written as
Xt =  Xt−1 +   t and (17)
Zt =  Xt, (18)
where   and   are coefﬁcient matrices, the elements of which are typically
nonlinear functions of the structural parameters, and   is a selection matrix
that maps the model variables to the observables.  t collects the innovations
of the shocks.
In applications, there are typically more variables than observables. The
empirical likelihood function can therefore not be computed in the standard
manner since the algorithm has to account for the evolution of the model
variables not in the data set. This can easily be done using the Kalman ﬁlter,
whichimplicitlyconstructstimeseriesfortheunobservedvariables. Asecond
concernforthemodeleristoensurethatthereisenoughindependentvariation
in the model to be able to explain the data. In order to avoid this potential
stochastic singularity, there have to be at least as many sources of uncertainty
in the empirical model as there are observables. This imposes a choice upon
the researcher that can affect the estimation results in a nontrivial manner.
In the benchmark speciﬁcation, I treat the model as a data-generating
process for four aggregate variables: unemployment, vacancies, wages, and
output. Apotentialpitfallisthatunemploymentandvacanciesarehighlynega-
tivelycorrelatedinthedataandmaythereforenotcontainenoughindependent
variation to be helpful in identifying parameters. Moreover, the employment
equation(4)impliesthatthesetwovariablesco-moveperfectly. Withbothun-
employment and vacancy data used in the estimation, this relationship would
most likely be violated. Hence, I need to introduce an additional source ofT. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 109
variation to break this link, which I do by making the match efﬁciency pa-
rameter an exogenous process. I choose not to include consumption since my
focus is on the labor market aspects of the model; nor do I use data on, for
instance, the hiring rate, q(θt), since the model implies that it is a log-linear
function of ut and vt.5
The use of four series of observables requires the inclusion of at least
four independent sources of variation. Researchers not only have to rely on
standardshockssuchastechnologyorvariationsinmarketpower(i.e., shocks
to the demand elasticity, ε), but they often have to introduce disturbances
that may be considered nonstandard.6 This can take the form of converting
ﬁxed parameters into exogenous stochastic processes, such as the shock to the
match efﬁciency, μ, used above. Shocks can also capture “wedges” between
marginal rates of substitution (Hall 1997), such as the one between the real
wage and the marginal product of labor, that the model would otherwise not
be able to explain. The labor shock, χ, is an example of this approach.
In order to implement the Bayesian estimation procedure, I employ the
Kalman ﬁlter to evaluate the likelihood function of the observable variables,
which I then combine with the prior distribution of the model parameters
to obtain the posterior distribution. The posterior distribution is evaluated
numerically by employing the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Further details on the computational procedure are discussed in Lubik and
Schorfheide (2005) andAn and Schorfheide (2007).
Data
For the estimation, I use observations on four data series: unemployment,
vacancies,wages,andoutput. IextractquarterlydatafromtheHaverAnalytics
database. The data set covers a sample from 1964:1–2008:4. The starting
date of the sample is determined by the availability of the earnings series.
Unemployment is measured by the unemployment rate of over-16-year-olds.
The series for vacancies is the index of help-wanted ads in the 50 major
metropolitan areas. I capture real wages by dividing average weekly earnings
in private nonfarm employment by the GDP deﬂator in chained 2,000$. The
output series is real GDP in chained 2,000$. I convert the output series to
per-capita terms by scaling with the labor force. All series are passed through
5 I analyze the implications of changing the set of observables in a series of robustness
exercises, where I also address the tight link between unemployment and vacancies.
6An alternative is to use shocks to the measurement equation in the state-space representa-
tion of the model. While this is certainly a valid procedure, these measurement errors lack clear
economic interpretation. In particular, structural shocks are part of the primitive of the theoreti-
cal model and agents respond to them. Measurement errors, however, are only relevant for the
econometrician and do not factor into the agents’ decision problem.110 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Prior Distributions
Deﬁnition Parameter Density Mean Std. Dev.
Discount factor β Fixed 0.99 —
Labor elasticity α Fixed 0.67 —
Demand elasticity ε Fixed 10.00 —
Relative risk aversion σ Gamma 1.00 0.10
Match elasticity ξ Beta 0.70 0.15
Match efﬁciency μ Gamma 0.60 0.15
Separation rate ρ Beta 0.10 0.02
Bargaining power of the worker η Uniform 0.50 0.25
Unemployment beneﬁt b Beta 0.40 0.20
Elasticity of vacancy creation ψ Gamma 1.00 0.50
Scaling factor on vacancy creation κ Gamma 0.05 0.01
AR-coefﬁcients of shocks ρi Beta 0.90 0.05




I choose priors for the Bayesian estimation based on the typical values used in
calibration studies. I assign share parameters a Beta distribution with support
ontheunitinterval, andIuseGammadistributionsforreal-valuedparameters.
I roughly distinguish between two groups of parameters—those associated
with production and preferences, and labor market parameters. I choose tight
priors for the former, but fairly uninformative priors for most of the latter
becausetheliteraturelacksindependentevidenceordisagreement. Thepriors
are reported in Table 1.
I set the discount factor, β, at a value of 0.99. The labor input elasticity,
α, is kept ﬁxed at 0.67, the average labor share in the U.S. economy, while
the demand elasticity, ε, is set to a mean value of 10, which implies a steady-
state mark-up of 10 percent, a customary value in the literature.7 I choose a
reasonably tight prior for the intertemporal substitution elasticity, σ, centered
on one. The priors of the matching function parameters are chosen to be
consistentwiththeobservedjob-ﬁndingrateof0.7perquarter(Shimer2005).
This leads to a prior mean of 0.7 for the match elasticity, ξ, and of 0.6 for
the match efﬁciency, μ. I allow for a reasonably wide coverage interval as
these values are not uncontroversial in calibration exercises. Similarly, I set
7 Estimating the model by allowing for variation in the ﬁxed parameters shows virtually no
differences in the estimates. Using marginal data densities as measures of goodness of ﬁt, I ﬁnd
that the preferred speciﬁcation is for an unrestricted α. The differences in posterior odds are tiny,
however, and it is well known that they are sensitive to minor speciﬁcation changes.T. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 111
the mean exogenous separation rate at ρ = 0.1 with a standard deviation of
0.02.
I choose to be agnostic about the bargaining parameter, η. Calibration
studies have used a wide range of values, most of which center around 0.5.
Since I am interested in how much information on η is in the data, which
matters for determining the volatility of wages and labor market tightness,
I choose a uniform prior over the unit interval. Similarly, the value of the
outside option of the worker is crucial to the debate on whether the search and
matching model is consistent with labor market ﬂuctuations (Hagedorn and
Manovskii 2008). Consequently, I set b at a mean of 0.4 with a very wide
coverage region.
The prior mean for the vacancy posting elasticity, ψ, is 1 with a large
standard deviation. Linear posting cost is the standard assumption in the
literature, but I allow here for both concave and convex recruiting costs as in
Rotemberg (2008). The scale parameter in the vacancy cost function is tightly
set to κ = 0.05. Finally, we specify the exogenous stochastic processes in the
model asAR(1) processes with a prior mean on the autoregressive parameters
of0.90andtheinnovationsashavinginverse-gammadistributionswithtypical
standard deviations. Moreover, I normalize the means of the productivity
process, At, and of the labor shock, χt, at 1, while the means of the other
shock processes are structural parameters to be estimated.
3. BENCHMARK RESULTS
Parameter Estimates
I report posterior means and 90 percent coverage intervals in Table 2. Three
parameter estimates stand out. First, the posterior estimate of η is almost
zero with a 90 percent coverage region that is concentrated and shifted away
considerably from the prior. This implies that ﬁrms can lay claim to virtually
their entire surplus (and are therefore quite willing to create vacancies) while
workers are just paid the small outside beneﬁt, b, and compensation for the
disutility of working (see Eq. [14]). Moreover, the disutility of working has
an additional cyclical component via the labor shocks. In order to balance
this so that wages do not become excessively volatile and thus stymie vacancy
creation, the estimation algorithm adjusts the contribution of the marginal
product downward, which reduces the bargaining parameter even further.
Second, theposteriorestimateofthebeneﬁtparameterb = 0.18ismoved
awayconsiderablyfromthepriorwithoutmuchoverlapwiththepriorcoverage
regions. The posterior is also much more concentrated, which indicates that
the data are informative. Thus, this estimate seems to indicate that the model
resolves the Shimer puzzle in favor of smooth wages to stimulate vacancy
posting, and not through a high outside option of the worker. Recall that
HagedornandManovskii(2008)suggestvaluesofbashighas0.9,towhichthe112 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Posterior Estimates: Benchmark Model
Prior Posterior
Mean Mean 90 Percent Interval
Relative risk aversion σ 1.00 0.72 [0.62, 0.79]
Match elasticity ξ 0.70 0.74 [0.68, 0.82]
Scaling factor matching function m 0.60 0.81 [0.58, 0.99]
Separation rate ρ 0.10 0.12 [0.09, 0.15]
Bargaining power η 0.50 0.03 [0.00, 0.07]
Beneﬁt b 0.40 0.18 [0.12, 0.22]
Vacancy cost elasticity ψ 1.00 2.53 [1.92, 3.54]
Vacancy creation cost κ 0.05 0.05 [0.03, 0.06]
posterior distribution assigns zero probability. This reasoning is misleading,
however, as some parameters may be speciﬁc to the environment they live
in. The beneﬁt parameter, b, is a case in point. In the model it is introduced
as payment a worker receives when unemployed. What matters for wage
determination, however, is the overall outside option of the worker, which
in my model is b + χtcσ
t . That is, it includes the endogenous disutility of
working. This becomes an issue of how to interpret the large variations in this
parameterthatarereportedinboththecalibrationandtheestimationliterature.
For instance,Trigari (2004) reports a value of b = 0.03 in an estimated model
thatincludesautilityvalueofleisureoverbothanextensiveandintensivelabor
margin, while Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) ﬁnd b = 0.98 in a framework
without these elements.
The discussion thus indicates that the generic parameter, b, is not struc-
tural per se, but rather a reduced-form coefﬁcient that captures part of the
outside option of the worker relevant for explaining wage dynamics. Its value
varies with the other components of the outside option. To get a sense of
the magnitude of the latter, I compute b + χcσat the posterior mean and ﬁnd
0.74 with a 90 percent coverage region of [0.56,0.88]. In the end, this does
give support to the argument in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that a high
outside option of the worker is needed to match vacancy and unemployment
dynamics via smooth wages. The caveat for calibration studies is that values
for b cannot be taken off the shelf but should be chosen to match, for instance,
wage dynamics.
The third surprising estimate is the vacancy posting elasticity, ψ, with
a posterior mean of 2.53, which is also considerably shifted away from the
prior. This makes vacancy creation more costly to the ﬁrm since marginal
postings costs are increasing in the level of vacancies, and therefore labor
markettightness. Thisestimateissubstantiallydifferentfromwhatistypically
assumed in the calibration literature. In most papers, vacancy creation costs
are linear, i.e., ψ = 1. Rotemberg (2008) even assumes values as low as
ψ = 0.2. AlikelyexplanationforthishighvalueisthatitbalancespotentiallyT. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 113





σ (y) 1.61 1.67
σ (u)/σ (y) 7.53 6.49
σ (υ)/σ (y) 9.13 7.81
σ (θ)/σ (y) 14.56 4.36
σ (w)/σ (y) 0.65 0.48
ρ (u,v) −0.89 −0.36
“excessive” vacancy creation that is driven by a low η and by the exogenous
shocks.
Estimates for the other labor market parameters are much less dramatic
and show substantial overlap with the priors. The posterior means of the
matching function parameters are in line with other values in the literature,
althoughthematchelasticity,ξ,of0.74isatthehighendoftherangetypically
considered. However, thereissigniﬁcantprobabilitymassonthemoretypical
values. The estimate of the level parameter, κ, in the vacancy cost function
simply replicates the prior, and would therefore not be identiﬁed in a purely
econometric sense. The estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity,
σ,a s0 .72 is not implausible, and it is reasonably tight and different from the
prior. The autoregressive coefﬁcients of the shocks (not reported) are largely
clustered around 0.8, which suggests that the model does generate enough of
an internal propagation mechanism to capture the still substantial persistence
in the ﬁltered data.
Ialsoassesstheoverallﬁtofthemodel, andreportsomestatisticsinTable
3. I ﬁrst compare the structural model to aVAR(2) estimated on the same four
data series. There is typically no expectation that a small-scale model such as
this can match the overall ﬁt of an unrestricted VAR. This is conﬁrmed by a
comparison of the marginal data densities (MDD).8 While the ﬁt of the struc-
tural model is clearly worse than theVAR, and would therefore be rejected in
a Bayesian posterior odds as the preferred model, it appears to be at least in
the ballpark. Perhaps a more interesting measure is how well the estimated
model matches unconditional second moments in the data. I compute various
statistics from simulation of the estimated model with parameters set at their
posterior means. The model is reasonably successful in matching these statis-
tics. The volatility of HP-detrended output is captured quite well, which is
8 The MDD is the value of the posterior distribution with the estimated parameters integrated
out. It is akin to the value of the maximized likelihood function in a frequentist framework.114 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
not surprising since the technology process, At, is identiﬁed as the residual in
the production function and therefore adapts to the properties of output. The
relative standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are also close to
the data, although the volatility of tightness is still considerably off. Finally,
wages are less volatile than in the data, which contributes to the relative suc-
cess of capturing vacancy dynamics. The estimated model is less successful
in capturing the high negative correlation between unemployment and vacan-
cies in the data, the so-called Beveridge curve. These ﬁndings should not be
overinterpreted, however, since the empirical model is designed to capture the
data well simply by virtue of the exogenous shocks. An example of this is the
presenceofthematchingshock,whichcanactasaresidualintheemployment
equation. Consequently, this relative goodness of ﬁt does not invalidate the
argument in Shimer (2005), which is based on a single second moment, the
volatility of tightness, and a single shock to labor productivity.
Icandrawafewconclusionsatthispoint. First,thestructurallabormarket
model captures the data reasonably well, in particular the high volatilities of
unemployment and vacancies and the relative smoothness of wages. The
parameters for the matching process are tightly estimated and close to those
found in the calibration and nonstructural estimation literature. There is more
discrepancy in the parameters that affect wage bargaining. The bargaining
power of the worker is found to be almost zero, while the outside option of the
worker is fairly high. The estimates thus conﬁrm the reasoning in Hornstein,
Krusell, and Violante (2005), but they also suggest that speciﬁc parameters
should not be interpreted as strictly structural. Furthermore, the posterior
estimates raise questions about the extent to which the performance of the
model is due to the inherent dynamics of the search and matching model or
whether it is largely explained by the exogenous shocks. I delve further into
this issue in the next section.
Variance Decompositions
I now compute variance decompositions in order to investigate the most im-
portant driving forces of the business cycle as seen through the model. The
results are reported in Table 4. The table shows that in the estimated model
unemployment and vacancies are exclusively driven by demand and matching
shocks. In the case of unemployment, the matching shock essentially takes
the role of a residual in the employment equation (4), which conﬁrms the
impression formed above in the comparison of simulated and data moments.
This illustrates the model’s lack of an endogenous propagation mechanism,
as emphasized by Shimer (2005), and the overall ﬁt of the employment equa-
tion. Similarly, the demand shock mainly operates through the job creation
condition (10) as it affects the expected value of a job.T. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 115
Table 4 Variance Decompositions: Benchmark Model
Technology Labor Demand Matching
U 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.92
[0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.14] [0.76, 0.99]
V 0.00 0.06 0.55 0.38
[0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.14] [0.41, 0.67] [0.25, 0.51]
W 0.32 0.10 0.43 0.15
[0.15, 0.45] [0.04, 0.17] [0.24, 0.50] [0.05, 0.26]
Y 0.71 0.04 0.04 0.21
[0.55, 0.87] [0.01, 0.08] [0.01, 0.08] [0.06, 0.32]
Employmentandvacancydynamicsthusappeartobelargelyindependent
from the rest of the model. An interesting implication of this ﬁnding is that
search and matching models that do not include either shock offer an incom-
pletecharacterizationofbusinesscycledynamicsinthesensethattheircontri-
bution would be attributed to other disturbances. An altogether more critical
view would be that the search and matching framework does not present a
theory for unemployment dynamics since they are explained exclusively by
the residual in the deﬁnitional equation (4). In other words, unemployment in
the data can be described by a persistent AR(1) process, which is introduced
by the matching shock. The intrinsic persistence component, i.e., lagged em-
ployment and via the endogenous components of the matching function, on
the other hand, does not seem to matter as it likely imposes restrictions that
are violated in the data.
The picture for the other variables is more balanced: 70 percent of out-
put variations are explained by the technology shock and 21 percent by the
matching shock because of its inﬂuence on employment dynamics. Demand
and technology shocks explain most of the wage dynamics, with the matching
shock coming in a distant third. It is perhaps surprising that the labor shock
does not matter more as it directly affects wages through the outside option
of the worker. Moreover, it appears directly only in the wage equation (14)
and thus could be thought of as a residual, similar to the matching shock.
The variance decomposition would, however, support the idea that the wage
equation is reasonably well speciﬁed and that the need for a residual shock,
designed to capture the unexplained components of wage dynamics, is small.
4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
I now perform three robustness checks to assess the stability of parameter
estimates across speciﬁcations and to analyze the dependence of estimates
andvariancedecompositionsonthespeciﬁcchoiceofobservablesandshocks.
The ﬁrst robustness check uses the same set of observables as the benchmark,116 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
but introduces anAR(1) preference shock to the discount factor, βtζt, instead
of the labor shock, χt. This changes the model speciﬁcation in two places:
The discount factor in the job creation condition (10) now has an additional
time-varying component, and the time preference shock essentially replaces
theleisurepreferenceshockinthewageequation(14). Sincethisspeciﬁcation
and the benchmark use the same set of observables, I can directly compare
the marginal data densities. The time preference shock speciﬁcation would be
preferred with an MDD of 673.4. However, there are only small differences
(not reported) in the posterior means and the 90 percent coverage regions of
the two speciﬁcations overlap considerably. As in the case of the labor shock,
the preference shock plays only a minor role in explaining business cycle
dynamics. It does, however, reduce the importance of the demand shock, εt,
in driving vacancies and wages. Its contributions are now, respectively, 0.42
and 0.29. This indicates that it may be difﬁcult to disentangle the effects of
a shock to the mark-up (which I labeled a “demand” shock) from those of
movements in the intertemporal utility function.
In the second robustness check, I remove one series from the set of ob-
servables. By excluding unemployment I can leave out the shock to match
efﬁciency, μt. This allows me to assess to what extent the model is able
to replicate vacancy and unemployment dynamics without relying on move-
ments in the residual. The prior speciﬁcation is as before. Selected results are
reported in Table 5. The estimates are, in many respects, strikingly different.
The bargaining parameter, η, is still very close to zero, while the beneﬁt pa-
rameter, b, is close to the prior mean, but also more concentrated. The total
valueoftheimpliedoutsideoptionisnow0.92andthusmatchesthecalibrated
value in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). The apparent reason is that in the
benchmark model, the matching shock played a crucial role in explaining un-
employment and vacancy dynamics. Without it, the estimation algorithm has
to compensate, and it does so in the direction suggested by these authors: a
low value of η and a high value of b. This impression is also supported by
the decline in the vacancy cost elasticity. The table also reports selected vari-
ance decompositions for unemployment, vacancies, and the wage. The term
in brackets below the entry denotes the largest contributor to the variation in
the respective variable. The contribution of the matching shock to vacancy
dynamics in the baseline version now gets captured by technology, which ex-
plains 39 percent, but the demand shock still explains 51 percent. Movements
in wages are now largely captured by the technology shock, while the demand
shock remains important with a contribution of 32 percent.
I also experiment with removing the output series from the set of observ-
ables. I then estimate the model for technology, matching, and labor shocks.
The removal of the demand shock has the most pronounced effect on the
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mark-up gets transferred to the technology process. It now explains, respec-
tively,61percentand71percentofthevariationsinvacanciesandwages. The
removal of the output series has no marked effect on the parameter estimates
compared to the benchmark. Obviously, including output helps pin down the
technologyprocessbutisotherwisenotcrucialforpinningdownthestructural
parameters.
The third robustness check only uses data on unemployment and vacan-
cies, the exogenous shocks being technology and matching. The predictions
from the estimated model are fairly clear-cut. Unemployment dynamics are
drivenbythematchingshock, whilevacancydynamicsaredrivenbythetech-
nologyshock. Theparameterestimatesareconsistentwiththeresultsfromthe
previous speciﬁcations. However, the coverage regions are noticeably wider
and closer to the prior distributions, which reﬂect the reduction in information
when fewer data series are used.
I can now summarize the ﬁndings from the robustness exercise as fol-
lows. The parameter estimates of the search and matching model are fairly
consistent across speciﬁcations. In particular, the parameters associated with
the matching process, i.e., the match elasticity, ξ, the match efﬁciency, μ,
and the separation rate, ρ, do not show much variation and are close to the
values reported in other empirical studies. The other parameters exhibit more
variation, in particular the beneﬁt parameter, b. Its estimated value is heav-
ily inﬂuenced by both the empirical speciﬁcation of the model as well as the
theoretical structure, and should therefore be properly considered a reduced-
form coefﬁcient rather than a structural parameter. Furthermore, the different
estimates of the vacancy cost elasticity, ψ, suggest that a model with linear
creation cost is misspeciﬁed.
Overall, the model matches the data and the second moments reasonably
well. Muchofthissuccessis,however,duetotheincidenceofspeciﬁcshocks.
Unemployment dynamics, for instance, are captured almost exclusively by
movements in the match efﬁciency, which acts as a residual in the equation
deﬁning how unemployment evolves. This calls into question whether the
restrictions imposed by the theoretical search and matching model hold in
the data and whether the model provides a reasonable theory of labor market
dynamics. The estimates also show that shocks that are not typically consid-
ered in the calibration literature, such as the matching or the demand shock,
are important in capturing model dynamics, while others, such as preference
shocks, play only a subordinate role.
5. CONCLUSION
I estimate a typical search and matching model of the labor market on ag-
gregate data using Bayesian methods. The structural estimation of the full
model allows me to assess the viability of the model as a plausible descriptionT. A. Lubik: Search and Matching 119
of labor market dynamics, taking into account all moments of the data and
not just selected covariates. The ﬁndings in this article are broadly consistent
with the literature and would support continued use of the search and match-
ing framework to analyze aggregate labor market issues. However, the article
also shows that the relative success of this exercise relies on atypical shock
processes that may not have economic justiﬁcation, such as variations in the
match efﬁciency. An alternative interpretation would be that the shock prox-
ies for a missing component in the employment. A prime candidate would be
endogenous variations in the separation rate. The article has also attempted to
make inroads into the issue of identiﬁcation in structural general equilibrium
models, mainly by means of extensive robustness checks with respect to al-
ternative data and shocks. Research into this issue is still in its infancy since
simple measures of identiﬁcation in nonlinear models of this kind are not easy
to come by.
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